

# Predicting Cyber-Attacks using Hawkes processes

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RESEARCH INITIATIVE  
**Cyber Risk: Actuarial Modeling**







# Outline of the Talk

- Data breaches dataset
- Hawkes model
- Fitting and prediction

# Data breaches dataset

## Privacy Rights Clearinghouse


- A public database that contains 8800 data breaches in the US over the period 2005-2019
- Different types of sources reporting the cyber breaches to the database



# Data breaches dataset


## Descriptive statistics over 2010-2018

### Types of breaches



- A majority of **Theft/Loss** and **Hacking/Malware**
- 21% of Unintended disclosure

### Types of organisations




- A majority in **Healthcare/Medical**
- Businesses are well represented too


# Data breaches dataset

## Cyber attacks frequencies by type and organization


Frequency of Theft/Loss




Frequency of Hacking/Malware



Frequency in Healthcare/Medical



Frequency in Businesses




- Apparent **clustering** by type of attacks
- Deterministic **trends** or stochastic regimes?
- Apparent **clustering** by type of organization attacked
- No clear **trends**


# Data breaches dataset

## Autocorrelation of the number of incidents


- Regression of the number of event during the **following month  $t + 1$**  as a function of the number of event during the current month  $t \rightarrow$  **should be independent for a Poisson process model to be valid**
- Autocorrelation dramatically increases when focusing on attacks and/or organizations of **the same type**




- R-squared : 0.154
- Confidence interval (95%)  
[0.030, 0.278]



- R-squared : 0.726
- Confidence interval (95%)  
[0.687, 0.766]



- R-squared : 0.780
- Confidence interval (95%)  
[0.750, 0.810]



- R-squared : 0.718
- Confidence interval (95%)  
[0.702, 0.735]

# Hawkes model

## Choice of the Hawkes model

### ■ Taking into account autocorrelation

- **Cox model** : Poisson model with stochastic intensity → difficulty to specify the stochastic intensity dynamics
- **Hawkes model** : Self-exciting model with stochastic intensity, fully specified by the point process itself

### ■ Choice of the Hawkes model:

- **Self-excitation**: every event increases the probability for a new event to occur within a given group (same organization or attack type) → Clustering
- **Inter-excitation**: in the case of multi-dimensional Hawkes process, every attack in one group increases the occurrence probability of new events in the other groups

### ■ Related references:

- Giesecke et al. (2010), Bacry et al. (2015) (finance)
- Peng et al. (2017), Baldwin et al. (2017) (cyber risk)



# Univariate Hawkes process

- An univariate Hawkes process with **exponential kernel** is a counting process  $N_t = \sum_{n \geq 1} 1_{T_n \leq t}$  with intensity:

$$\lambda(t) = \mu(t) + \sum_{T_n < t} \alpha \exp(-\beta(t - T_n))$$

$\mu: \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  is a deterministic baseline intensity

- The sum represents the **impact of past events**; it captures the **self-excitation property**



- Each jump represents an attack
- Clustering phenomena
- Intensity decreases **exponentially** between jumps



# Multivariate Hawkes process

- Multivariate Hawkes process allows to model interactions **between types of entities/attacks/states**:


$(N_t^{(1)})_{t \geq 0}, \dots, (N_t^{(K)})_{t \geq 0}$ ,  $K$  counting processes with **jump times**  $(T_n^{(1)})_{n \geq 1}, \dots, (T_n^{(K)})_{n \geq 1}$

The **intensity process** with exponential kernel of the counting process  $(i)$  is defined as:

$$\lambda_i(t) = \mu_i(t) + \sum_{j=1}^K \sum_{T_n^{(j)} < t} \alpha_{i,j} \exp\{-\beta_{i,j}(t - T_n^{(j)})\}$$

$\alpha_{i,j}, \beta_{i,j}$ : **Impact of group j on group i**

Intensity of Hawkes processes for 2 groups



Group 1 self-excitation

Impact of Group 2 on Group 1

**Matrix of excitation:**

$$\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_{1,1} & \alpha_{1,2} \\ \alpha_{2,1} & \alpha_{2,2} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0.0 & 0.99 \\ 0.0 & 0.90 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Group 2 is **purely self-excited**
- Group 1 is **fully influenced by Group 2**

# Kernels of multivariate Hawkes process

- « Classical » exponential kernel:

$$\phi_{i,j}(s) = \alpha_{i,j} \exp(-\beta_{i,j}s)$$

- Instantaneous excitation
- Complexity:** we assume all  $\beta_{i,j}$  (excitation memory of  $i$  from  $j$ ) depend on the groups and are to be calibrated
- The intensity process is not Markov (for dimension  $\geq 2$ )



- Kernel with delay:**

$$\phi_{i,j}(s) = \alpha_{i,j}s \exp(-\beta_{i,j}s)$$



- The intensity process is not Markov (even in dimension 1)
- Complexity:** we assume all  $\beta_i$  (excitation memory of  $i$  from any other group) depend on the groups and are to be calibrated

*Development of closed-form formulas for the expected number of claims for such multivariate Hawkes processes*

Kernels



Intensity process



# Fitting and prediction

## Data grouping

- **Crossing variables: attack type, sector, state**
  - Retaining groups with more than 200 attacks and remaining in OTHER
  - Total: **six groups**

Group	Number of breaches
OTHER (1)	2046
MED & DISC & OTHER (2)	497
BUSINESSES & HACK & OTHER (3)	386
MED & HACK & OTHER (4)	472
MED & THEFT/LOSS & CALIFORNIA (5)	214
MED & THEFT/LOSS & OTHER (6)	943

# Model specification

- The three Hawkes kernels considered



	Kernel 1 (exp)	Kernel 2 (exp)	Kernel 3 (delay)
$\phi_{i,j}(s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} \exp(-\beta_i s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} \exp(-\beta_{i,j} s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} s \exp(-\beta_i s)$
Nb parameters	54	84	54

- Baseline intensity:  $\mu_i(t) = \mu_{0,i} + \gamma_i t$  to account for **trends** in the dataset

- Possibility to add a Lasso penalty (not discussed here)

$$L(\mu, \phi)_{penalized} = L(\mu, \phi) - \nu \sum_{1 \leq i, j \leq d} |\alpha_{i,j}|$$

- Reduce complexity
- Improve prediction capacity



# Calibration results

- **Likelihood:** kernel 3 with delay best fits the data

	Kernel 1 (exp)	Kernel 2 (exp)	Kernel 3 (delay)
$\phi_{i,j}(s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} \exp(-\beta_i s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} \exp(-\beta_{i,j} s)$	$\alpha_{i,j} s \exp(-\beta_i s)$
Nb parameters	54	84	54
-Likelihood (2011-2015)	6513	6172	<b>6153</b>
-Likelihood (2011-2016)	7639	7516	<b>7485</b>

- **Adequacy tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov):** adequacy is satisfactory, except for group (4)

OTHER (1)	0.0503	0.0865	0.9060
MED & DISC & OTHER (2)	0.5546	0.1300	0.5173
BUSINESSES & HACK & OTHER (3)	0.5558	0.5966	0.3363
MED & HACK & OTHER (4)	0.0024	0.0361	0.0370
MED & THEFT/LOSS & California (5)	0.1146	0.5669	0.4246
MED & THEFT/LOSS & OTHER (6)	0.0733	0.6341	0.5379

# Calibration analysis

Captures the baseline non-excited intensity

Same orders of magnitude

	$\mu_0^{(i)}$	$\beta_i$	$\gamma_i$
OTHER (1)	0.87	5.39	-2.53e-04
MED & DISC & OTHER (2)	0.02	6.88	9.52e-05
Businesses & HACK & OTHER (3)	0.12	7.31	-3.56e-06
MED & HACK & OTHER (4)	0.02	5.75	9.65e-05
MED & Theft/Loss & CALIFORNIA (5)	0.05	5.96	-7.26e-06
MED & Theft/Loss & OTHER (6)	0.36	5.84	-1.07e-04

captures the historical trend

Table 7: Parameters  $(\mu_0^{(i)})_{1 \leq i \leq 6}$ ,  $(\beta_i)_{1 \leq i \leq 6}$  and  $(\gamma_i)_{1 \leq i \leq 6}$

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	6.04	6.06	4.36	3.51	2.54	2.95
2	1.48	6.28	1.82	4.70	3.31	0.83
3	1.45	1.34	3.17	1.84	0.14	1.15
4	0.31	2.83	1.74	8.37	0.32	0.12
5	0.38	0.62	0.12	1.19	7.80	0.99
6	2.03	2.57	3.15	1.63	0.83	6.70

Table 8: Parameters  $(\alpha_{i,j})_{1 \leq i,j \leq 6}$

Captures the major self/external interactions

Strong reciprocal self-excitation of groups (2) and (4)

«Causal» excitation of (2) by (5)







Strong self-excitation in these MED groups

Matrix of ratios between maximal excitation and baseline intensity:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	0.47	0.47	0.3	0.28	0.19	0.23
2	4	17	5	12.5	9	2
3	0.58	0.58	1.33	0.75	0.08	0.5
4	1	9	5.5	26.5	1	0.5
5	0.4	0.8	0.2	1.4	9.6	1.2
6	0.36	0.44	0.56	0.28	0.14	1.17

Table 10: Ratios Maximum excitation/basic intensity  $(\frac{\Gamma_{i,j}}{\mu_0^{(i)}})_{1 \leq i,j \leq 6}$

# Out-of-sample prediction results for 2017 (kernel 3)



Simulation based on the thinning algorithm for point processes

Predictions with mean and (0.5%, 99.5%) percentiles

Joint prediction of all groups capturing the causal and asymmetric interactions

Parameter uncertainty can be added

# Conclusion

## ■ Take-away message

- **Heterogeneity** of the database: the choice of the groups is determinant for the prediction accuracy.
- **Auto/inter-excitation**, calibrated using multivariate Hawkes processes (and kernel with delay)
- Projection: **whole joint distribution of the events' arrivals** (and not only the marginal distributions)

## ■ For further study

- **Risk Exposure**
- **Severity** of cyber risk: see Sébastien Farkas' talk



# References

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# Thank you for your attention



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